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Introduction! 
Again, the relationship between Norway and Europe is the main issue in 
Norwegian foreign policy debates. The European architecture undergoes 
rapid changes, and developments both in the European Community and in 
Eastern Europe have brought new focus on Norway's European policy. In 
this study we will go back in history and look at the very first attempts, 
in newly independent Norway, to shape a European policy as an answer 
to plans for European integration. Norway was given the opportunity, or 
should we rather say was forced, to elaborate her own stance in the 
discussions about European cooperation that took place in the last half of 
the 1920s and in the beginning of the 1930s. 
It was greatly to the credit of two men that the question of European 
integration was put on the agenda in the twenties. They were Richard N. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the non-governmental Pan-European 
Union, and the French minister of foreign affairs, Aristide Briand. Briand 
"dared in carefully chosen words to propose to the Assembly of the 
League of Nations in September 1929 the project of a European federal 
union."1 
What was the Norwegian reaction to these thoughts about a new European 
design? How did Norway meet Briand's challenge? 
Coudenh.ove-Kalergi versus Hambro 
In 1943, in the midst of The Second World War, Richard N. Coudenhove-
Kalergi, the persistent European who had devoted his life to the idea of 
European Unity, published his book Crusade for Pan-Europa.' In this 
autobiography Coudenhove-Kalergi continued his campaign for the need 
to create a United States of Europe. The same year Car! J. Hambro, 
President of the Norwegian Parliament (Stoning) and from 1939 President 
of the Assembly of the League Nations (Hambro had been a very active 
delegate to the League of Nations since 1926!), also published a book, 
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Crossroads of Conflict, European Peoples and Problems. In the intro-
duction to the book Hambro puts his general argument in a nutshell, 
expressing what was a common view among those relatively few 
Norwegians who were occupying themselves with the question of 
European cooperation between the two world wars: 
No "European problem" exists for the simple reason that no Europe exists 
and no Europe has ever existed. Europe is not a continent like America; 
it is just a part of the tremendous area made up of Asia, Africa and 
Europe. It has never been established where Europe ends and Asia begins, 
and there has never been a European history as we speak of the history 
of America or Australia because Europe never was a logical entity, but 
only a vague general denomination for an undefined territory. It is only 
in this sense the word can be used ... "' 
These two books illustrate the wide gulf that, right back to 1905, has 
separated the ideology of European integration from prevailing Norwegian 
attitudes to Europe. The first book was written by one of the foremost 
ideological fathers of the non-governmental European movement, the other 
by an outstanding Norwegian politician (Hambro was for several periods 
leader of the conservative party in Norway). Coudenhove-Kalergi conveyed 
the message that "Europe [must] follow ... the inspiring example of the 
United States of America, by organizing ... a United States of Europe".' 
Harnbro, on the contrary, emphasized the great difference between the 
United States and Europe and called into question whether "such a 
political structure (as in the USA) would be possible anywhere else".' 
This almost anti-European frame of mind was an integrated part of 
Norway's general foreign policy from the day she got her independence 
from Sweden in 1905. The first minister of foreign affairs in newly inde-
pendent Norway, J~rgen L~vland, told the Storting in october 1905 that 
the task for Norwegian foreign policy was to keep Norway out of 
"combinations and alliances that can drag us into belligerent adventures 
together with any of the European warrior states"." Norway adopted a 
foreign policy line consistent with this view. It rested on the two main 
pillars of neutrality and belief in a great power consensus about Scandi-
navia as a kind of sanctuary.' Behind this declared policy of non-
alignment from 1905 until 1940, we can find the hard core in Norway's 
foreign policy - the unspoken assumption that if great power consensus 
broke down and the policy of neutrality failed, then Great Britain would 
in her own interest come to her rescue. 
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This is the background and basis of Norway's position also in relation to 
the Briand plan, the main tenets of her thinking being: 
Neutrality and non-alignment; 
A feeling of remoteness from the conflict areas of the great powers, 
and resistance to schemes which threatened to undermine this 
situation; 
A feeling of distance geographically and politically from the 
European continent, in contrast to the not always outspoken, but 
very real affinity with Great Britain. 
The first traces of Nonvegian attention to the concept 
of 'The United States of Europe" 
In the spring of 1926 the leader of what was somewhat enigmatically 
called "The committee of those interested in Oslo"("Komiteen av 
interesserte i Oslo", i.e. those interested in the plans for a United States 
of Europe) wrote to the Prime Minister asking for the government's views 
on the idea of a Scandinavian initiative towards "the creation of a United 
States of Europe."' Prime Minister Lykke answered that he doubted, for 
the time being, that such a proposal was within the realms of feasibility. 
The Prime Minister emphasized that the main task for Norway at this 
stage was to contribute to the consolidation of the League of Nations. 
Norwegian reluctance to give up any part of the newly won national 
freedom and sovereignty, even in a Scandinavian framework, surfaced. 
Lykke held the view that the Scandinavism apparent to him in the 
proposal would make Norwegian approval of the scheme even more 
difficult! 
In the same year the former Greek minister of foreign affairs, Nikolas 
Sokrates Politis, gave a number of lectures on the topic "L'organisation 
internationale de l'Europe" in the Norwegian Nobel Institute. This event 
attracted some attention in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Politis' visit to Norway was also the starting-point for the frrst, however 
limited, discussions in the Norwegian press of the political re-organization 
of Europe - in effect, of the formation of a United States of Europe. 
In an interview with Aftenposten, a conservative daily newspaper, Politis 
argued for the creation of a union of the 26 European states. Contrary to 
the Norwegian view, he claimed that such a Union actually would 
strengthen the League of Nations. Politis knew that one of Norway's 
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leading delegates to the League of Nations, Christian L. Lange, was 
against the idea.10 Lange had the previous year accompanied Coudenhove-
Kalergi on his first trip to the USA, where Coudenhove-Kalergi made a 
series of speeches explaining the aims of the Pan-European Movement. 
Lange's task was to oppose this point of view on behalf of the League of 
Nations." Lange and most articulate Norwegians, including members of the 
government and journalists, feared that a European Union would weaken 
the League of Nations and were not at all in favour of the idea. Politis 
hoped that support for the union would grow, and as he bluntly put it in 
the interview: "Maybe even Monsieur Lange in the end will say - "Oh, 
yes, the idea was not so silly after all."" 
Briand puts the question of a European union 
on the agenda 
Plans for a European Union or a European Federation, which appeared 
from time to time following the First World War, did not make any 
significant impression in Norway. Norway was forced to formulate her 
position only when the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, proposed 
that the European states should form some kind of a European federation. 
Briand presented his proposal in a speech in the League of Nations 
September 1929. Spring 1930, the French government developed the 
scheme in a memorandum to the 27 European members of the League. 
We are not here going to discuss Briand's motives, but only give a brief 
account of the substance of the plan. Briand' s speech and the plan was 
vaguely worded, and it is difficult to see how he actually planed to 
combine his proposal of a European Federal Union with his assurances 
that national sovereignty would be fully respected. The memorandum 
contained four main points: 
1. Based on a pact between the European members of the League of 
Nations, these states should take upon themselves the obligation to 
have regular meetings. The purpose of these meetings was to secure 
a constant development of European cooperation. 
2. For this purpose, the establishment of new and independent 
European institutions was necessary. The memorandum mentioned 
a European Conference, an Executive Committee, and a European 
Secretariat. 
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3. The basic principles and directions for a European organization 
should be established. First of all, political cooperation should have 
priority over economic collaboration. Political cooperation should 
aim at reaching one essential objective - federation. Collaboration 
in the economic field between the nations of Europe should aim at 
the creation of a kind of common market, in which "the circulation 
of goods, capital and persons would be facilitated". 
4. In addition to the political and economic aspects, Briand envisaged 
the launching of cooperative ventures in a variety of fields, from 
communication and transit, higher learning and the arts.12 
The Norwegian reaction to Briand's initiative 
Even though there had been some minor discussions of the topic, it was 
Briand's initiative September 1929 that gave the impetus for the only 
thorough debate on European integration in Norway in the period between 
the two world wars. 
Two months before Briand's speech in the League of Nations, the Nor-
wegian press reported that Briand in the near future would present an 
appeal for the creation of a United States of Europe. 13 All the newspapers 
adopted a guarded attitude, but curiosity about Briand's imminently 
expected initiative was apparent. The mouthpiece of the growing Labour-
party, Arbeiderbladet, drew distant historical parallels. The newspaper 
reminded its readers of another Frenchman who, over 300 years ago, had 
toyed with the same ideas as Briand: the French King Henry IV, Henry 
of Navarra. The concept of a United States of Europe was "pretty then 
and is still pretty. There was little chance for the idea to be realized at the 
beginning of the 1600s, and the chance is no greater in 1929", the 
newspaper said.14 The common view in Norway was that the concept of 
a United States of Europe was a highly unrealistic one. 
Another aspect of the Norwegian attitude until Briand's September speech, 
was general agreement about his motives. The initiative was seen as a 
reaction to revision of the United States' customs tariff. A Norwegian 
business journal argued, for example, that the protectionism which was 
inherent in the proposed new customs tariff, would give the American 
textile-industry a monopoly in its home-market. 15 The European answer to 
this challenge could be to organize herself along the same lines as the 
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USA. This was regarded by the Norwegians as Briand's most profound 
motive for his initiative.16 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced the first official comments on 
Briand's speech on September 5 in the League of Nations. The memo-
randum was written by Johan Ludvig Mowinckel, Prime Minister, minister 
of foreign affairs and Norwegian First Delegate to the tenth session in 
the League of Nations in 1929.11 
The memorandum originates from a "dejeuner" Briand held for all 
European First Delegates on September 9, 1929. Briand's intention with 
the meeting was to discuss his thoughts about a "European confederation." 
The only Norwegian comment to be found in this document concerns the 
quantity of food and wine consumed at the meeting! The rest of the 
document refers to the reactions from other European countries. And even 
if it seems as though Mowinckel did not participate in the debate, we can 
assume that his views did not deviate much from those of Arthur 
Henderson, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
Henderson underlined the difficulty of creating a European group. In view 
of her imperial responsibilities, Great Britain in particular could not be 
expected to tie herself to this kind of European grouping. Then he made 
some critical remarks which Norway, with her sensitivity to the reactions 
of Great Powers, would presumably support. "We must not forget Russia 
... Experience tells us how difficult these Soviets are in negotiations, and 
how suspicious they are of the rest of Europe." He feared that "irres-
pective of assurances that cooperation will be in the economic field only, 
Russia would allege that it was also military and that it was directed 
against the Soviet Union."" The result of the meeting was that everybody 
accepted a Swiss proposal that the French government should take the 
initiative and approach each European government to elicit their opinion. 
Two days after this "dejeuner", Prime Minister Mowinckel gave his main 
speech in the Assembly of the League of Nations. He made no comment 
on the Briand-plan whatsoever." Actually, Norway was very passive 
during the September meeting in 1929. Not once did the Norwegian 
delegates take part in the general debate. 20 This absence of interest was 
confirmed in the Storting in the beginning of May 1930. The Storting 
discussed the report from the September session of the Assembly. Nobody 
mentioned Briand's plan, and not one word was said about the need to do 
something about the organization of Europe.21 
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The same is true with regard to the Norwegian press. We can conclude 
that the Norwegian government and Norwegian opinion generally, at this 
stage, were not inspired by, or involved in, the Briand plan. Norway was 
still a rather lukewarm European. 
Norway's answer to the French proposal 
On May 17, 1930, Norway received the French memorandum including 
Briand's proposal of a scheme for European cooperation. Immediately, this 
triggered an unusual activity in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
memorandum was sent to all the ministries, to the National Bank, and of 
course to all the central advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most 
of the ministries did not recognize the importance of Briand's proposals, 
nor did the National Bank. But four of the answers, all from respected and 
influential people or ministries, went thoroughly into the matter. Together 
they give a fairly good picture of how the Briand-plan was seen by those 
in power in Norway. 
The first comment was written by Professor Frede Castberg. Castberg, who 
in 1930 joined the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations, was 
a prominent adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His advice to the 
government was to show "the greatest possible reservation" with regard to 
the French proposals. His reasoned as follows: 
1. Norway's policy, both before and after the establishment of the 
League of Nations, had been to "support universal cooperation 
between all the nations in the world, and discourage the establish-
ment of regional groupings"; the Pan-European idea and the Briand 
plan were contrary to this political line. 
2. A political union between the states of Europe could disturb the 
relationship with both Russia and the United States of America. 
3. Europe as a geographical formation was not particularly suitable to 
provide the basis for a grouping of nations. "Are we going to 
include the British Empire in Europe?", Castberg asked. And if the 
answer was to be "No", then the question naturally suggested itself 
whether Norway had closer ties to, for example, the Balkan 
countries than to the British Dominions. Doubt about Europe as a 
natural unit, and scepticism as to whether the Balkan countries had 
a natural place in plans for European cooperation were central 
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elements in Norwegian attitudes before, during and after the Second 
World War. 
4. In the French memorandum political cooperation had the first 
priority. Castberg expressed particular concern because the memoran-
dum spoke about "a gradual extension, including the whole European 
community, of a policy based on international guarantees like those 
in the Locarno treaty." In connection with this, Castberg reminded 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Norway resisted all arrange-
ments that involved military commitments, even the sanction 
obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
5. Last, but not least, Castberg raised a serious objection from the 
Norwegian point of view: the French proposal denied ·membership 
of the proposed organization to non-European countries, and even 
excluded one of the European states, namely Russia. (Only members 
of the League of Nations were allowed to join the projected 
European pact originally.)22 
This last point was emphasized in the comments from the Ministry of 
Defence and from the Commanding General, Ivar Bauck. Bauck saw the 
French initiative as a reflection of the deep divisions between the 
European states. To Bauck, the proposal indicated that even a power like 
France did not consider the existing agreements to be a sufficient 
guarantee for her security. The general also feared that the scheme would 
deepen existing differences between the states and that any security 
arrangement would be less effective if one of Europe's great powers, the 
Soviet Union, was excluded from the European cooperation. He pointed 
out that Russia herself had alleged that the "union plan was hostile to the 
Soviet Union." The Commanding General concluded his deliberations by 
stating that he would not recommend Norway to join a European Union 
of the kind proposed by France. Bauck argued that Norway's line of non-
alignment was already weakened by joining the League of Nations, and 
that she should not continue this erosion of her main foreign policy line. 
He also repeated an argument that he knew would enlist the sympathy of 
almost everybody in Norway - that Norway should avoid involvement in 
European great power politics. 23 
Christian L. Lange, who had taken part each year in the sessions of the 
League of Nations, sent his opinions of the French proposal. His views did 
not differ from those already mentioned. He insisted strongly that Europe 
lacked the preconditions for the creation of a federal organization. In his 
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optmon, the following elements would have been necessary for such a 
federation to be effective: a common spiritual heritage, a common 
language, a common history and common traditions, and, minimally, a 
certain degree of economic self-sufficiency. None of these, according to 
Lange, were present in Europe. His concluding remarks left no doubt: 
There is no foundation for a special European organization. Europe is a 
purely geographical concept, and you cannot build a political organization 
exclusively on a geographical basis. That was what happened [ ... ] with 
Norway and Sweden in 1905. "24 
Christian L. Lange also commented on Coudenhove-Kalergi's "so-called 
Pan-Europe." Lange did not like this idea at all, because in his opinion it 
implied a political antagonism towards Russia and the alienation of Great 
Britain from continental Europe. He pointed out that the only British 
politician he knew who supported the idea of Pan-Europe, was Mr. Amery, 
a "declared imperialist, who finds the future of Great Britain in a custom-
union with her dominions and colonies, and who looks at the League of 
Nations with cool contempt. "25 
In her answer the Norwegian government expressed "great satisfaction" 
with the French initiative. The government supported the view that 
something had to be done about the present scattered European continent. 
But as to what exactly should be done the Norwegian government, like 
many other European governments, became vague. Doubts and objections 
emerged, which was not surprising considering the Norwegian attitude 
towards closer cooperation and considering the findings of government 
advisers. Norway rejected the French idea of giving precedence to political 
cooperation. While the Norwegian government fully supported the idea of 
economic cooperation between European nations, it argued that political 
cooperation was a 
sore subject where ... national and historical considerations played a central 
pan ... and cenainly like other countries ... Norway could not give her 
approval to arrangements which could imply military commitment.26 
To conclude: The deliberations in Norway revealed a very sceptical 
attitude towards European integration. Norwegian attitudes to European 
integration highlighted some of the basic premises of Norway's foreign 
policy: 
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1. With regard to the impact of a European Union on the relaiionship 
between the great powers, Briand's exclusion of the Soviet Union 
evoked particular concern. 
2. As to the geographical frames of a European integration scheme, 
doubt was raised concerning the European "nature" of the Balkan 
countries. Norway even called into question the use of the concept 
of "Europe" as suitable in discussions about schemes of cooperation. 
3. Military cooperation between Norway and a continental grouping 
was rejected. Neither was there any desire for closer political links 
with continental Europe. Norwegian interest in European cooperation 
was limited to the economic field. Norway never contemplated a 
federation; she would only participate in traditional international 
cooperation between sovereign states. 
4. Norway emphasized in her Foreign Policy the relationship to a small 
number of genuine great powers, and was sceptical to extensive 
cooperation between small states. 
5. Norway based her security on isolationism combined with an 
unspoken great power, i.e. British, guarantee. 
ll.930s: Briand's proposal fades away 
.from the political agenda 
Mter the thorough investigations preceding the Norwegian reply to the 
French government's memorandum, the Briand plan almost disappeared 
from the political agenda in Norway. The newspapers made only passing 
references to the matter. At the time of the official reply political 
commentaries, on the whole, emphasized the reserved attitude of almost 
all the European governments, including the Norwegian one.27 Dagbladet, 
a daily newspaper of the same political persuasion as the government, was 
disappointed over the moderate tone of the government's reply. The 
newspaper demanded a more ambitious policy.28 Arbeiderbladet, reflecting 
the views of the Labour party, was uncertain of Briand's motives, and 
had no doubt that the coming meeting of the League of Nations would 
arrange "a festive funeral" for the Briand plan.'9 
As the September meeting in the League of Nations drew nearer, the 
image of Norway as a lukewarm and passive European, became clearer. 
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The meeting in Geneva and especially the Briand plan, were conspiciously 
absent in Norwegian political debates. As in the previous year, Norway 
was almost invisible and inaudible during the general debate in the 
Assembly of the League of Nations. In the end, Norway of course sup-
ported the proposal from Guiseppe Motta and Vojislav Marinkovic (Yugo-
slavia) to appoint a "Commission d'etude pour !'Union europeenne". 
Neither were the European questions prominent when the Storting later 
debateed and looked back on the government's foreign policy during the 
year 1930."' In a foreign policy survey in February 1931 Prime Minister 
Mowinckel briefly discussed the frrst meeting of the "Commission of 
Enquiry for European Union". This was, however, a purely technical 
review, and it did not evoke any comment or discussion.31 
In the autumn 1930 Professor Frede Castberg, who, as mentioned before, 
was a prominent adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented 
on the Briand plan in a newspaper interview. Not having changed his 
attitude towards the plan, he was far from positive. He emphasized that 
Europe needed the participation from non-European countries to solve the 
continent's problems and conflicts. Castberg re-asserted his view that a 
European organization should not be formed to the detriment of the 
League of Nations. His conclusion was that cooperation between groups 
of states with a common interest was preferable to a pan-European 
solution. 32 
After the eleventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of 
Nations, Briand's initiative only once came into prominence in Norway. 
The occasion was the second session of the "Commission of Enquiry for 
European Union", which was held January 16-21, 1931. 
Johan L. Mowinckel was attending the session as Norway's representative. 
His off-the-record judgement was that "the Europe conference [i.e. the 
Commission] had not developed very satisfactorily. 'Great-Power politics', 
with tricks and contra-tricks, have played a significant part."" Mowinckel 
was here referring specifically to the joint German and Italian proposal to 
invite the Soviet Union to join the Commission. This was, according to 
Mowinckel, done "to annoy France and a lot of other countries". On 
behalf of the Nordic countries, Mowinckel asserted that such an invitation 
was contrary to the League of Nations resolution establishing the 
Commission. In the final vote on this issue Mowinckel abstained, not 
because he was against cooperation with the Soviet Union as such, but 
because he had some formal objections, and he did not consider the 
question mature for decision. He was also doubtful about the ability of the 
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Soviet Union to give useful advice on the problems in "capitalistic 
Europe"." The Soviet Union had no appreciation of such nice distinctions, 
and Izvestiia attacked Norway for openly joining the anti-Soviet bloc." 
According to Izvesttia, Mowinckel's conduct could only be regarded as the 
surfacing of latent hostility towards the Soviet Union. Even if this was 
only noise for propaganda purposes rather than real foreign policy reaction, 
it made some impression in Norway. Norway was reminded that her 
powerful neighbour, the Soviet Union, tended to be highly critical of 
schemes of European cooperation without Soviet participation. 
Conclusion 
The Briand initiative triggered the very first Norwegian discussions about 
European integration and about Norway's place in the integration process. 
It turned out that Norway was not ready to join any European coope-
ration scheme in the 1930s. In essence, she wanted to confine any 
cooperation to the economic field, and would not give up any part of her 
sovereignty. Norway showed no inclinations to deviate from her general 
foreign policy line. 
There was a feeling in Norway, and probably in many other European 
countries as well, that Briand's initiative was ahead of its time. But there 
was also awareness of the long-term significance of Briand' s proposal. 
Amold Ra:stad, one of the advisers to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Mfairs, wrote: 
Irrespectively of the consequences, the fact that Briand prompted the 
discussion in this way, compelling all the governments of Europe to 
discuss the question and to be answerable before their own people and 
the whole world, would be an enduring honour for Briand.36 
In the words of a Norwegian journal: "It must be the fate and greatest 
political task of the new generation to erect the pillars of this new 
temple."" 
Norway today still hesitates as to whether she should move into "the 
temple". The arguments first raised against Norway joining Briand's 
Europe have received encouragement and renewed vigour each time 
Norway has discussed her position towards the forces of integration in 
Europe. 
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Since Norway became independent in 1905 Norwegian European policy 
has gone through three phases: 
1. Until 1950 there was a tendency towards an anti-European image; 
2. In the 1950s Norway judged European cooperation to be desirable, 
but Norway stopped short of direct participation; 
3. In the late 1950s and in the early 1960s, Norway slowly realized 
that she was more and more an integrated part of Europe. This 
situation demanded a more active European policy. The political 
leadership came to the conclusion that Norway, on certain premises, 
both was able to, and in fact had to, participate in a organized 
Europe. Public opinion, however, did not unreservedly agree." 
This is where Norway stands today: is the political leadership able to 
convince the Norwegian people that Norway needs to join the European 
Community '! Briand started the whole discussion in 1929; the definitive 
Norwegian answer will probably be given in the 1990s. 
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